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The lifetime gender gap in Italy. 
Do the pension system countervails 
labour market outcomes? 
 
Roberto Leombruni (Università di Torino and Laboratorio Revelli) 




In Italy large work career gender gaps currently exists, particularly regarding wages 
and activity rates. The paper investigates the issue looking at lifetime incomes, where 
from  the  one  side  all  the  career  gaps  tend  to  accumulate,  from  the  other  the 
redistribution acted by the pension system may mitigate the differences. Exploiting 
an  original  database  on  the  entire  work  careers,  we  document  how  the  pay  gap 
constantly opens with age and how women tend to cumulate lower seniority. Both 
gaps  have  an  impact  in  the  pension  calculation,  so  that  the  day  after  retirement 
gender differences are even higher. By means of a microsimulation model we show 
that  the  pension  system  partially  countervails  labour  market  outcomes,  implying 
lower differences in lifetime incomes. However, due to the current transition to an 
actuarially neutral system, the effect is going to vanish in following decades, posing 
some concerns about future prospects of gender income inequality. 
Introduction 
Taken  at  their  face  value,  the  differences  in  average  wages  earned  by  men  and 
women in Italy do not seem particularly worrying. The most recent estimates on the 
unconditional gender wage gap are below 6%, which are among the lowest levels 
among developed countries (EC 2011; OECD 2010). A consistent literature, however, 
has  showed  that  if  one  turns  to  conditional  differences,  controlling  for  the  main 
socio-economic characteristics of workers  and possible selection effects  of women 
into  employment,  the  gender bias is much higher and more  in  line with what is 
currently found in many countries (Isfol 2011; Centra and Cutillo 2009; Olivetti and 
Petrongolo  2008;  Addabbo  and  Favaro  2007;  Rustichelli  2005;  Istat  2005).  Plus,  a “glass  ceiling”  seems  to  exist,  meaning  that  gender  discrimination  is  binding 
particularly for high wages and top professions (Isfol 2011; Arulampalam et al. 2005). 
Another  area  where  gender  differences  do  raise  concerns  in  Italy  is  about 
employment. From the one side, women labour market participation is far below the 
targets the European Council set  in  Lisbon and Stockholm and is  far below  men 
participation. Statistics say that Italy, with Malta and Greece, is the only European 
country where the gender activity gap is over 20 percentage points, to be compared 
with the Nordic and Baltic countries where the gap is 7 percentage points or less 
(Eurostat 2010). From the other side, women who do participate to the labour supply 
face in Italy a probability of unemployment sensibly higher than men (Leombruni 
and  Richiardi  2006;  OECD  2004;  Azmat,  Güell  and  Manning  2004;  European 
Commission 2002). Both factors translate into a gender employment gap which is the 
highest among European countries (Olivetti and Petrongolo 2008). 
A unifying perspective to address the various gender gaps that may open in a 
work  career  is  that  of  lifetime  incomes.  A  large  employment  gap,  even  when 
associated  with  just  mild  wage  differences,  translates  into  a  large  lifetime  work 
income gap. Moreover, in most countries both the seniority and the average pay are 
taken  into  account  in  the  pension  calculation,  so  that  the  two  kind  of  gaps  do 
translate also into low pensions. It has been estimated that on average in Europe 22% 
of women aged 65 and over are at risk of poverty compared to 16% of men, and the 
pay gap is considered a driver of the difference (European Commission, 2011). Under 
this respect, Italy is again a country where the gender bias is high. In 2003, 50% of 
retired  women  were  earning  a  pension  about  €  520,  which  is  barely  above  the 
minimum pension threshold, to be compared with a median pension for males which 
was roughly two times higher (Mundo 2007). 
 
Although  relevant,  the  empirical  evidence  on  gender  differences  in  lifetime 
incomes is scant, mostly due to the limited availability of sufficiently long panel data. 
Exploiting  two  different  databases  of  administrative  source  –  the  Work  Histories 
Italian  Panel  (WHIP)  and  the  National  Social  Security  Administration  (INPS) 
Contribution Accounts (CA) archive – we have been able to recover the entire work 
career of a sample of people who retired at mid 2000s. The first contribution of the 
paper is to exploit these data to study how gender differences evolve over the work 
career and how they translate into differences in lifetime work incomes. The main 
result is that the differences in weekly wages do amplify with age: they are low at the 
very start of the career (under 10%) and reach 23.4% just before retirement, with a 
sensibly  worse  situation  among  white  collar  women.  Looking  at  lifetime  work 
income the gap is higher, at 27.7%, due to the lower seniority accrued by women. 
We then turn to the question whether the pension system mitigates these gaps. 
This is of particular importance in Italy, since the old defined benefit system is been 
gradually abandoned towards a regime inspired by actuarial fairness. For all workers 
under  the  new  regime  the  lifetime  work  income  will  matter,  so  that  whichever 
differences have accumulated during the work career will be reflected also during 
retirement. Was the old system really mitigating the gender differences? If so, next decades could witness a further deterioration of the situation of elder women in Italy. 
Actually, the old system was progressive in the books but contained also many other 
sources  of  horizontal  redistribution,  so  that  to  assess  whether  it  was  really 
redistributive or not is by all means an empirical matter. To address this, we build a 
microsimulation  model  social  security  contributions,  pension  calculation-  and 
updating  rules  active  in  the period. The  main  result  is that  for  the  cohort  under 
investigation  the  pension  system  partially  countervails  labour  market  outcomes, 
implying a lifetime income gap 30% lower than the lifetime pay gap. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In next section we review the current evidence 
about  the  gender  pay-  and  employment  gap  in  Italy.  We  then  present  the  main 
features of Italian pension system pre- and after the reforms, with the focus on its 
redistributive features. In sections four we describe the data we collected on work 
careers and the microsimulation model we used to extend them after retirement. We 
then move to the analysis of the various gender career gaps that we can measure in 
the data and how they are modified taking into account the pension system. A final 
section will resume the main results and briefly discuss the policy implications. 
An overview on gender career gaps in Italy 
The gender pay gap 
Looking  at  the  magnitude  of  the  pay  gap,  gender  disparities  in  Italy  are 
unquestionably  low  when  compared  to  most  developed  countries.  The  OECD 
average  gap  in  2008  was  about  18%  for  full  time  workers’,  slightly  over  15% 
considering the gap in median earnings instead than average ones (OECD 2010). The 
same figures for Italy were as low as 1.2% and 1.3% respectively. Within Europe, the 
European  Commission  reported  that  in  2009  women  earned  in  average  17%  less 
gross hourly wages than men in the EU-27 as well as in the euro area (EC 2011, 
public administration and defence workers excluded). Italy had the second lowest 
gap, at 5.5%. 
This is not a recent achievement. Even though the trend observed in last decades 
has been that of a reduction, a consistent literature had shown that already in the 
Nineties the unadjusted pay gap in Italy was among the lowest1. Moreover, it is the 
only  country  where  the  gap  is  completely  absent  in  the  public  sector  –  to  be 
compared, for instance, with a gap over 20% in Britain, Finland and the Netherlands 
(Arulampalam et al. 2005; European Commission 2002). 
As we will discuss, this is just as a first-round evidence, which has to be checked 
for  possible  composition  and/or  selection  effects  and  complemented  taking  into 
                                                       
1 See Centra and Cutillo 2009; Olivetti and Petrongolo 2008; Addabbo and Favaro 2007; Arulampalam 
et al. 2005; European Commission 2002. The reduction in the unadjusted gap has been documented in 
Mundo  e  Rustichelli  2007;  Favaro  and  Magrini  2005;  Rustichelli  2005.  For  a  recent  assessment 
considering a wider set of countries see Ñopo et al. (2011). For a review of the studies measuring the 
wage gap in Italy see Addabbo e Favaro (2007). consideration also other career aspects. Before we do this, however, let us briefly 
summarize the current discussion on gender differences in wages. 
Many theories have been put forward to explain the pay gap and its variability 
across  countries,  with  the  intent  of  understanding  whether  there  is  an  economic 
rationale behind it or we should take it as a sign of gender discrimination. The most 
immediate is to try and explain unadjusted differences in wages with differences in 
observable characteristics that the labour markets rewards, such as education. The 
general  conclusion  that  one  can  drive  from  the  literature  is  that  an  important 
component  of  the  differential  remains  unexplained,  pointing  to  some  form  of 
discrimination (Ñopo et al. 2011). To our purposes, the most interesting strand of the 
literature  is  focused  on  how  and  when  these  differentials  emerge  during  work 
careers. 
A common stylized fact under this respect is that gender differences are relatively 
modest  at  the  labor  market  entry  and  increase  over  time,  with  the  exception  of 
Germany, where there is a high entry wage differential (Hospido 2009; Manning and 
Swaffield 2008; Napari 2006; Kunze 2002). A common explanation traces back this 
stylized fact to differences in human capital accumulation. Women accumulate less 
work experience because they have a more irregular labour market attachment and 
engage  more  often  in  part-time  work.  Moreover,  the  anticipation  of  their  lower 
attachment  may  affect  current  investments  in  human  capital  (Ben-Porath,  1967). 
Another  important  approach  is  the  job-shopping  theory  (Topel  and  Ward,  1992), 
which states that an important part of wage growth is associated with moving from 
worse  to  better-paying  jobs.  Under  this  respect,  women  are  typically  more 
constrained in their opportunities to change jobs than men and are less concerned 
with money when they do (Manning 2003a). 
Manning and Swaffield (2008) investigate this in the UK. At labour market entry 
the differences are negligible but ten years after they measure a gap of 25 log points. 
They  try  and  decompose  the  gap  resorting  to  human  capital  and  job  shopping 
theory, plus a theory put forth by Babcock and Laschever (2003) which argues that 
women tend to have a lower opinion of themselves than men so do not ask their 
bosses for what they want and passively accept wage offers rather than bargain for 
better conditions. Manning and Swaffield’s estimate that human capital factors can 
explain about 12 log points of the overall gap, job-shopping 1.5 log points and the 
psychological factor half a log point. This means that a substantial unexplained gap 
remains: women who have continuous full-time employment, have had no children 
and express no desire to have them earn about 12 log points less than equivalent men 
after 10 years in the labour market. 
Also in Finland (Napari 2006) the gender wage gap increases significantly during 
the first 10 years of the career. Focalizing on university graduates, the author shows 
that gender differences in the accumulation of work experience and in the type of 
education explain about 16 percent of the gap; differences in employer characteristics 
account about 10 percent; differences in background characteristics account about 27 
percent. The most important single factor contributing to the gender wage gap is the family type: Women seem to suffer considerable larger wage losses due to marriage 
and children than men. 
Spain is another country where the opening of the wage gap in the early phase of 
the career has been associated both to a gender wage penalty to interruptions and a 
gender wage penalty to mobility (Hospido 2009). 
 
Indeed, the origins of the wage gap have been vastly investigated also for Italy. 
For  what  concern  both  the  conditional  level  of  the  gap  and  the  “return  to 
characteristics”  story,  the  general  result  is  not  a  positive  one:  as  it  seems,  the 
conditional gap is much higher then the unadjusted one, and the part due to different 
returns  to  characteristics,  usually  interpreted  as  discriminatory,  is  high  and 
increasing  in  time.  Istat  (2005),  focusing  in  the  industry  and  service  sectors  and 
considering only companies with at least 10 workers find for 2002 a wage gap around 
16 percentage points; the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition shows that the 69.4% of the 
gap is due to the different returns to characteristics. Rustichelli (2005) estimates a 
random effect model to explain wages of private sector non agricultural employees 
in 1996-2002, obtaining a wage gap of 39 log points, that for the 69% is due to the 
different returns to characteristics – a share which is increasing in time. The latter 
evidence  is  confirmed  by  the  “Comitato  nazionale  parità  e  pari  opportunità” 
(National  Committee  for  Parity  and  Equal  Opportunities  2001),  which  reported  a 
discriminatory part rising from 81% to 84% from 1993 to 1995 (the gender wage gap 
moving from 25 points to 20); and by Flabbi (2001), which estimated a discriminatory 
part going from 54.3% in 1977 to 72.8% in 1995 (the gender wage gap moving from 
29.4 points to 18.9). 
A recent study exploiting an ad hoc survey delivered in 2007 confirms these results 
(Isfol 2011). Actually, just a negligible role for composition effects is reported, which 
moreover  is  negative  in  sign  –  meaning  that  women  carry  in  the  labour  market 
characteristics  which on  average  are  more  valued  than  those  brought  by  men.  A 
further  result  reported  is  that,  although  the  discriminatory  part  is  decreasing  in 
education, a “glass  ceiling” exists, meaning  that gender discrimination  is  binding 
particularly for high wages and top professions. The latter result was reported also in 
Arulampalam  et  al.  (2005),  who  found  a  glass  ceiling  in  Italy  and  in  four  other 
European countries (Denmark, Finland, France and the Netherlands). 
 
For  what  concerns  work  careers,  Del  Bono  and  Vuri  (2008)  find  confirmative 
evidence that the wage gap is modest at labour market entry and increases over the 
time. They find that the average female to male wage ratio is as high as 94.8% at the 
time of entry into the labour market, but decreases to about 84.9% after the first ten 
years of working experience. They find a substantially difference in wage growth 
due  to  job  changes  and  that  this  gender  differential  is  particularly  large  when 
considering between-firm, rather than within-firm job changes. Similar results are 
reported also in Biagioli (2007) and Tronti (2007). The employment gap 
Olivetti  and  Petrongolo  (2008)  put  the  accent  on  other  gaps,  mostly  the  one  on 
employment rates. Their starting point is the observed negative correlation in Europe 
between  the  gender  wage-  and  the  employment  gap. The  authors  argue  that  the 
differences in employment should not be taken as random and that the selection of 
women into work may play an important role in explaining the observed wage gaps. 
The  idea  is  that,  if  women  who  are  employed  tend to  have  relatively  high-wage 
characteristics, low female employment rates are consistent with low a wage gap 
simply because low-wage women are not featured in the wage distribution. Using 
various  techniques  they  impute  wages  for  those  not  in  work  in  a  given  year, 
obtaining higher median wage gaps for most countries. The increase is small in the 
US, the UK and most central and northern EU countries, and becomes sizeable in 
Ireland, France and southern EU, all countries in which gender employment gaps are 
high. In particular, in Italy the median wage gap on the imputed wage distribution 
reaches closely comparable levels to the other countries. 
Actually, if we take a life cycle perspective, the existence of an employment gap is 
per se  important for its consequences on life time incomes. A large employment gap, 
even when associated with just mild unitary wage differences, translates into a large 
lifetime  work  income  gap.  Moreover,  in  most  countries  both  the  employment 
intensity during the life course and the average pay are taken into account in the 
pension calculation, so that a given lifetime work income gap translates further into a 
pension gap. 
Under  this  respect,  Italy  has  one  of  the  worst  performances  among  developed 
Countries. The first part of the story is about activity rates, that is, the difference in 
how many women participate to the labour market with respect to men. Up to a two 
decades ago this was by all means a common issue across Europe, particularly in 
Continental  and  Southern  Countries,  but  while  most  of  them  have  succeeded  in 
reaching or at least approaching the targets the European Council set in Lisbon and 
Stockholm, the employment gains that we have witnessed in Italy have not been 
sizeable  enough  to  significantly  narrow  the  gender  gap  in  employment.  Current 
statistics say that Italy, with Malta and Greece, is the only European country where 
the gender activity gap is over 20 percentage points, to be compared with the Nordic 
and Baltic countries where the gap is 7 percentage points or less (Eurostat 2010; the 
EU average is about 13 p.p.). This is a long standing issue that has to do with many 
cultural, institutional and socio-economic aspects that we can not here review2. What 
is worth citing here is that, in the years that we will analyze, a prominent role was 
played  by  the  pension  system,  which  allowed  a  widespread  praxis  of  early 
retirement for women, with a large impact on their activity rates at prime- and elder 
ages (Leombruni and Villosio 2006; Blondal and Scarpetta 1998 and 1999). 
In  turn,  those  women  that  do  participate  to  the  labour  supply  face  in  Italy  a 
probability of unemployment which is sensibly higher than men, both unadjusted 
and controlling for observable characteristics (Leombruni and Richiardi 2006; OECD 
                                                       
2 The reader is referred to Del Boca et al. 2009 and 2005; Del Boca and Sauer 2009). 2004; Azmat, Güell and Manning 2004; European Commission 2002). Low activity 
rates and high unemployment probabilities translate into an employment rate which, 
in 2010, was almost double with respect to EU27 average (21.6 percentage points 
versus 11.9)3. 
The pension gap 
How the two gaps actually translate into lifetime income differences? Direct evidence 
on the topic is scant, mostly due to the limited availability of sufficiently long panel 
data. Actually, the first objective of the paper is exactly to fill this gap, exploiting an 
original database on entire work careers. What has already been documented is that 
in many developed countries older women receive considerably less pension income 
than older men4. 
In Italy  too  pension  incomes  are  highly  gender-biased.  In  2003,  50%  of  retired 
women were earning a pension about € 520, which was barely above the minimum 
pension  threshold,  to  be  compared  with  a  median  pension  for  males  which  was 
roughly two times higher (Mundo 2007). This seems to correlates mainly with very 
large differences in the seniority accumulated by women: the median retired women 
had accumulated a seniority just up to 20 years, and only 10% had a seniority of 35 
years or plus. To a closer look, the seniority distribution is bimodal: a large share of 
women actually withdraw from the labour market once they reached the minimum 
seniority requirement, than staying idle until they met also the age requirement. This 
seldom happens with men: more than half male pensioners had a career of 35 years 
or more. 
The  question  that  we  may  ask  is  whether  such  a  high  pension  gap  is  due  to 
overwhelming  differences  in  lifetime  incomes  or  to  a  malfunctioning  of  the 
redistributive mechanisms. In a sense, the latter point is not an open issue: a wide 
literature has already pointed out several pervert redistributions that were (and in 
part still are) present in the defined benefit Italian scheme. What has not yet been 
investigated is what is the net effect of the various redistributions put forth by the 
system, particularly under a gender perspective, which is the second objective of our 
paper. 
The redistributive features of the pension system 
The redistribution in the books 
The Dini reform in 1995 put into action a gradual transition from a defined benefit 
regime towards a notional defined contribution one inspired by actuarial fairness. 
The old system is still entirely in force for workers who had a seniority of 18 years or 
more at the time of the reform; for those below the threshold, a pro quota formula is 
                                                       
3 Our elaborations on Eurostat data from Eurostat Website/Population and social conditions/Labour 
market, at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat, extracted on October 2011. 
4 See for instance Bardasi and Jenkins (2010) and the seminal paper by Even and Macpherson (1994). adopted to calculate the pension: part of the benefit is computed with the old rules, 
part with the new ones5. 
The bottom line is, for all workers who are currently retiring in Italy the pension 
regime is for the most part still the old one, which, at least in the books, was inspired 
by a strong progressive principle. The progressivity was implemented in three ways: 
in the provision of a Minimum Pension Benefit (MBP); in the pension calculation 
formula; in the pension indexation formula. 
The pension calculation applies a typical defined benefit formula. Whatever the 
total amount of contributions paid by a worker during her career, the pension P is 
equal to: 
(1)  P = a S Yt  
where a is the accrual rate for each year of work, S is the number of years of 
seniority  (with  a  maximum  of  40)  and  Yt  is  the  so  called  “pensionable  income”, 



















where pt is a price index at time t6. The progressivity is implemented in the accrual 
rate  a,  which  has  a  base  value  of  2%  and  gradually  decreases  for  pensionable 
incomes exceeding a threshold (the so called “pensionable ceiling”), as in Table 1. 
Tab 1: The decreasing annual accrual rate 
Law 
Pensionable earnings brackets  66/88  503/92 
0 to PC  2  2 
PC to 1.33*PC  1.5  1.6 
1.33*PC to 1.66*PC  1.25  1.35 
1.66*PC to 1.90*PC  1  1,1 
1.90*PC and over  1  0.9 
Notes: PC is the Pensionable Ceiling (in 2010, 42.364 yearly euros). 
After  retirement  a  further  redistribution  of  resources  is  put  in  place  by  the 
incomplete price-indexation of pension benefits for the amount exceeding two times 
the MPB. The scheme has been modified several times: table 2 display the values 
                                                       
5 Here and in what follows we focus just on the rules for private sector employees whose pension is 
administered by the National Institute for Social Security (INPS) by means of the Pension Fund for 
Private  Employees  (FPLD).  We  also  limit  our  discussion  just  to  the  redistributive  features  of  the 
system and how the reforms changed them. A brief outlook to the functioning of the current pension 
system may be found in Guardiancich (2010). For a more general discussion of the reforms see, for 
instance, Fornero and Sestito (2005). 
6 The price index used is different according to a further transition put forth by the Amato reform in 
the defined benefit formula. See next footnote. active for the cohorts of pensioners that we will study. As an example, after 2007 the 
amount of pension exceeding 5 times the MPB is updated just at 75% of the inflation 
rate. 
Table 2: Evolution in the Incomplete Price-Indexation Scheme 
   Law  
Brakets   449/97  388/00  127/07 
0 to 2*MPB  1  1  1 
2*MPB to 3*MPB  0.9  1  1 
3*MPB to 5*MPB  0.75  0.9  1 
5*MPB   0  0.75  0.75 
Notes: MPB is the Minimum Pension Benefit (in 2010, 5.992,61 monthly euros) 
The redistribution in action 
The pension calculation we reported in formulas (1)-(2) actually do imply a further 
redistribution with respect to a purely actuarial rule. From the one side, in (1) there is 
no consideration of age or gender, but only seniority. For what concern gender, the 
higher life expectancy of women imply that on average they will receive benefits for 
a longer period of time. A similar situation is produced by the absence of age in the 
formula. Keeping the seniority constant, those who start working earlier may retire at 
a younger age and hence receive the benefit for a longer time with no penalization in 
the pension benefit: they too receive an actuarial premium. Since those who start 
earlier are on average less qualified workers with lower wages, we may presume that 
this mechanism tend to add progressivity in the system. 
From  the  other  side,  in  (2)  there  is  an  implicit  actuarial  premium  to  highly 
dynamic careers, since only the wages in the final years are taken into account. Since 
dynamic careers are typical of workers in the top quantiles of the wage distribution, 
we may presume that the premium turns out to be a disparity of treatment between 
the poorest and the rich, in favour of the latter. Actually, the Amato reform in 1992 
addressed this issue and partially corrected it, gradually extending the window over 
which to compute pensionable earnings7. 
The (very long) path to neutrality 
The Dini Law introduced in the system the principle of actuarial neutrality, but did it 
so very gradually: it will fully apply to workers entered in the labour market after 
1995; it applies pro quota to workers with less than 18 years of seniority at 19958; it 
does not apply for the other workers. 
                                                       
7 The Amato Law addressed the potentially pervert redistribution implied by the dynamic careers 
premium, extending the computation of the wage average, in the planned regime phase of the reform, 
to the entire working life. A gradual transition was designed, which still applies at least pro quota to all 
workers who are going to retire up to 2020s, where the window over which the average wage is 
computer is progressively extended from 5 to 15 (25) years for workers with a seniority higher (lower) 
than 15 years at the time of the reform (1992). 
8 A part (a quota) of the pension, will be computed under the Amato rules, a part under the Dini ones. 
The Amato quota will gradually decrease in time. Summing up, although in the long run the system will be a neutral one, workers 
retiring today and up to 2015-2020 will be under a pure Amato regime. As regards its 
redistributive character, we may expect: 
￿  a progressive tendency due the decreasing accrual rate (Table 1); 
￿  a progressive tendency due the decreasing pension updating rule (Table 2); 
￿  a progressive tendency due to the early retirement effect; 
￿  a regressive tendency for the dynamic career effect. 
What is the gender balance among the four is entirely an empirical question that 
will be addressed later in the paper. 
Data and methods 
Work histories from labour market entry to pension 
We exploit two databases. The first is the Work Histories Italian Panel (WHIP), a linked 
employer-employee  longitudinal  database  built  at  the  University  of  Torino  in 
cooperation  with  the  Statistics  and  actuarial  department  of  the  National  Social 
Security Administration (INPS) out of a 1% sample of INPS’s administrative data9. 
We  used  the  employee  section  of  the  database,  which  is  very  accurate  about 
wages,  seniority  and  pensions  for  private  sector  dependent  workers  in  Italy. The 
reference population is made up by all the people – Italian and foreign – who have 
worked  in  Italy  even  for  only  a  part  of  their  career.  For  each  of  them  the  main 
episodes  of  the  career  are  observed:  working  spells  –  including  dependent 
employees, quasi-dependent work (the “parasubordinato” work), self-employment 
activities as artisan, trader and freelancer –; retirement; non-working spells in which 
the individual received social benefits, like unemployment subsidies. Looked from 
the other way round, the workers who stay out of WHIP are those working in the 
public  sector  plus  some  categories  of  high  professional  self  employed,  such  as 
lawyers or notaries, who have an independent social security fund. 
From WHIP we extracted the flow of workers who entered into retirement in 2004 
for whom we observed at least a part of their work career10. The very limit of the 
sample for our purposes is that it does not contain information on employment spells 
prior to 1985, which is necessary to study lifetime work incomes. 
 
To this purpose we exploited the Contributions Accounts archive (CA), a database 
maintained  at  INPS  which  collects  summary  information  on  all  kind  of  social 
security contributions paid or credited in favour of workers. The data are driven 
from the same administrative sources and with the same sampling frame as WHIP. 
                                                       
9 A complete documentation about the database and its access policies can be found at 
www.laboratoriorevelli.it/whip.  
10 Actually, in WHIP also pensioners from other pension funds are observed, most notably pensioners 
coming from a public dependent careers. Since we have no information on their career we do not 
consider them. Although the information it provides is less rich and accurate with respect to WHIP, 
it includes all incomes and worked weeks starting from 1975 on, plus information on 
worked weeks prior to 1975. Thanks to a deterministic link among the two sources, 
than,  we  obtained  data  on  complete  work  careers  for  individuals  who  entered 
retirement  in  2004  with  all  the  necessary  information  to  compute  lifetime  work 
incomes and social security contributions, with the only exception of wages before 
1975 (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Data sources on the work careers of individuals in the sample 
 
Notes: WHIP: Work Histories Italian Panel; CA: INPS’ Contributions Accounts archive. 
To recover missing wages before 1975 we used propensity score matching as a 
nearest-neighbour  imputation  technique  (Chen  and  Shao,  2000  and  2001)11.  We 
defined as receivers those who entered in the labour market prior to 1975, for which 
the initial wages are missing (remember that the exact year of entry is known since 
the number of yearly worked weeks is included in the data). We defined as donors 
those who entered the labour market after 1975, for which we have data about their 
entire career (up to 2004). The idea has been that of matching donors and receivers 
with similar wage profiles in the ages for which the career is observed for both. For 
instance, if the receiver entered in the labour market in 1970 at the age of 20, the 
wages are observed from when s/he is 24 on. Then, we look for a donor who started 
working after 1975 who has similar demographic and job characteristics and a similar 
wage profile for the ages from 24 on12. Once a match has been found, the information 
on the donor career in the ages 20 to 24 is used to impute wages to the receiver. 
To take into account the different phases of the economic cycle in which donors 
and receivers are active, wage growth differentials with respect to aggregate income 
growth rates have been used as matching variables. Similarly, we did not directly 
impute wages, but wage growth differentials that we used – together with the GDP 
growth time series – to backward calculate the needed average weekly wages. 
The technique has been validated masking wages in three years (1976-1978) and 
imputing them back using receivers and donors around the year 1978. Regressing the 
true wage on the imputed values we obtain an R-squared between 0.6 and 0.713. 
                                                       
11 More precisely,  we used the “Mahalanobis metric matching within calipers  defined by the  propensity 
score” (see Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983), as implemented in the macro “%psMatching()” for the SAS 
statistical package (Leombruni and Mosca 2011). 
12 We used as matching characteristics all the (few) variables available in the CA archive (gender, 
region of work, age of labour market entry, classification in white and blue collar) plus the wage 
differentials and the amount of work in the first available five ages. 
13 Data available upon request. Pension incomes from retirement on 
To add pensions to lifetime incomes we need all the flow of pension benefits after 
retirement and up to death. Additionally, to evaluate eventual systematic gender 
differences in the actuarial premia/losses individuals receive, we need to compare the 
actual pension received by individuals with an actuarially neutral one. In order to 
achieve  both  goals  we  built  a  dynamic  microsimulation  model,  which  computes 
social security contributions and the pension benefits flow. We may classify it as an 
arithmetic  model,  since  it  does  not  contain  any  true  behaviours  on  the  part  of 
individuals. Our sample is composed by workers who actually decided to retire in 
2004,  so  that  their  entire  work  career  is  already  completed  –  and  hence  their 
contributions are just to be computed applying the appropriate contribution rates – 
and their subsequent income history is entirely determined by the pension updating 
rule,  the  mortality  event  and  the  inflation  scenarios.  The  unique  quasi-behaviour 
included is due to the consideration of survivors benefits, which we implemented 
with a rather simple probabilistic model. 
The  microsimulation  is  made  up  of  several  modules14.  The  main  ones  are  the 
“Contributions Module”, which computes the pension contributions paid or credited 
in  favour  of  workers  during  their  working  lives,  in  order  to  obtain  the  total 
contributions accrued during the whole career capitalized at GDP’s nominal rate of 
growth. 
Total contributions are then used in the “Pension Calculation Module” to compute 
the benchmark, actuarially neutral pension. As a benchmark we choose the benefit 
computed  using  the  Dini  rule  without  the  topping  up  to  the  minimum  pension 
benefit. Indeed, the neutrality of the Dini rule has been questioned, mostly because of 
the somewhat outdated life expectancies used to calibrate the formula’s coefficients, 
but overall it is considered a good approximation of an actuarially fair and neutral 
system  (Belloni  and  Maccheroni  2006).  The  pension  module  models  also  the 
possibility that a retired individual will earn a survivor pension. The model has two 
steps: we first estimated a logistic model to compute the probability of earning a 
survivor  pension,  stratified  by  gender,  as  a  function  of  cohort  and  age;  we  then 
estimated the  amount  of  the  benefit  regressing  it  on  gender, cohort,  age  and  the 
(direct) pension benefit amount15. 
Once all the benefits amount are available in the data (the actual-, the survivor- 
and the benchmark one), the “Pension Indexation Module” updates them using the 
mechanism of incomplete price-indexation in force in the simulated year as in table 2 
above16. 
                                                       
14 We implemented it using ModGen (Model Generator), a generic microsimulation programming 
language  supporting  the  creation,  maintenance  and  documentation  of  dynamic  microsimulation 
models, created by Statistics Canada. See http://www.statcan.gc.ca/microsimulation/modgen/modgen-
eng.htm. A more detailed description of the model can be found in Leombruni and Mosca (2011). 
15 We estimated the two models on the entire WHIP population in order to have a higher statistical power; the 
results are available upon requests. Note that also active workers may receive a survivor or an indirect pension, 
but empirically this is a negligible event for the cohort and the selection considered in the sample that enters in 
the microsimulation. 
16 We used a base scenario with an inflation rate of 1.7%, stable in time. Finally, a “Mortality Module” applies to individuals a fixed horizon mortality using 
age and gender specific life expectancies as computed by the National Institute of 
Statistics for the general population17. We do not use Monte Carlo draws on the age 
and  gender  mortality  probabilities  to  avoid  introducing  a  purely  random 
redistribution across individuals. 
The gender lifetime income gap 
Work career gaps 
We start presenting some results on the gender pay gap in the WHIP sample, that is, 
among all non agricultural dependent employees in the private sector in Italy in the 
years 1985 to 2004. The unadjusted gap has been declining during all the period, 
from 28% in 1985 to about 16% in 2004 (Figure 2, panel a). Taking into consideration 
that we are not considering public sector workers, where the gap in Italy, if any, is 
positive, the picture seems coherent to the values under 10% measured in last years 
by the reports of the European Commission. 
Looking at some subpopulations, we may note that the regions where the gap was 
higher during the Eighties (the Centre and South of Italy) are catching up the levels 
measured for the North. By age, we have a confirmation for young workers the gap 
is lower. We also note that the gap among the young steeply decreases in the first 
part of the period and then it does not change much in the following decade. The 
most notable result, however, is about skill level. The decrease notwithstanding, the 
pay gap within blue and white collars at the end of the period is as high as 22% and 
36% respectively, which are values far above the average for the whole population. It 
is apparent that the population figure is mainly driven by a skill level composition 
effect: female workers are in these years mostly white collar ones, and white collars 
earn  on  average  much  more  that  manual  workers.  This  is  coherent  with  the 
conditional  gaps  that  we  reported  in  the  literature  review,  which  where 
systematically higher to the unadjusted one. 
                                                       
17  See  http:/demo.istat.it.  Actually,  there  is  evidence  that  there  are  mortality  differences  for  the  working 
population with respect to the entire one, which is relevant particularly for women (see Leombruni et al, 2010). 
As complete mortality tables are not still available, we leave the exploration of this to a future work. Figure 2. Wage gap among non agricultural, private sector Italian dependent employees, 
1985-2004. Whole population and by area, age class and skill level. 
 (a) all workers 
 
(b) by geography 
 
(c) by age 
 















1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003






1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003






1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003
White Collar Blue Collar
Source: our calculations on WHIP data 
We now limit the scope to the individuals in our sample, that is, workers who 
retired in 2004 from a career spent in the private sector. 
In table 3, rows 1-3, we report the career gaps we can measure around retirement. 
At the moment in which they stop working, women have a unitary wage level which 
is 23.5% lower with respect to men. Also the cumulated employment gap is high: on 
average, they have been working 14.7% less. The immediate implication of this is that 
the day after retirement the income gap sensibly widens: women’s initial pension on 
average is 31.5% lower than men’s one. 
To a closer investigation, the individuals in our sample by and large confirm the 
evidence  we  already  quoted  from  Mundo  (2007),  who  reported  a  bimodal 
distribution of seniority among retired women18. As it seems, there are two rather 
distinct career paths followed by women: those with a short career which ends in 
their prime age years, who then stay idle up to the time they become eligible for old 
age  pension19;  those  with  a  more  “traditional”,  male-style  career,  staying  in  the 
labour market up to the time of retirement. If we partition our sample according to 
the time gap between the end of work activities and the start of pension, we see that 
the gender seniority gap roughly doubles for workers who staid idle more that two 
years with respect to individuals with a work-retirement transition within 9 months 
(table 3, columns 2-3). The share of women in the two groups increases also (38% 
versus 28% respectively), although also the share of men who stay idle is far from 
negligible. As a matter of fact, in this group there are both individuals who decide to 
                                                       
18 For the sake of brevity we do not report the seniority distributions by gender. They are available upon request. 
19 In the social security jargon, these are the workers who are referred to as “silent”. early withdraw from the labour market even if they are not yet eligible for a pension 
(presumably, the majority of them being women); and individuals who have been 
laid off by their employer and are under a long term unemployment scheme which 
pays them a benefit up to their pension eligibility (the so called “mobilità lunga”; in 
this group there are not particular gender selections in action, see Paggiaro et al. 
2009). 
In order to have a more homogeneous population and more interpretable results, 
in  what  follows  we  will  focus  only  on  individuals  with  a  direct  work-retirement 
transition  (within  9  months).  Among  them,  the  wage  gap  measured  just  before 
retirement is still high, at 23.4%. The employment gap however is lower (8.4%), so 
that the day after retirement the gender gap increases less dramatically, to 25.2%. 
 
Looking at how the unadjusted gap evolved during their entire life cycle, we may 
note three distinct phases (see Figure 3, panel a). In the very initial years of their 
career, from 16 up to about 22 years old, gender differences are low and a bit erratic. 
Then the gap steeply increases for about ten years. From then on, the gap remains 
roughly stable but for a further slight increase towards the end of the career. The 
employment gap also shows two distinct phases: At very young ages it is women 
that do work more (see panel b). This is explained by the call for compulsory military 
service that the men of this cohort had to answer. From 24-25 years old on, men’s 
employment intensity is systematically higher with respect to women’s. Skill level is 
again an interesting viewpoint (panel c and d). White collars women see the gap 
steeply and continuously increase up to retirement. For blue collars on the opposite 
the wage gap opens mostly in the first ten years of the career, then from 30 years old 
on it is stable, at around 20% up to retirement. Their employment gap is particularly 
high (and higher than for white collars) in the ages of high fertility. Figure 3. Career gaps over the working life cycle among non agricultural, private sector 
Italian dependent employees who retired in 2004. Whole population and by skill level. 
 (a) gender wage gap, all workers 
 
(b) gender employment gap, all workers 
 
(c) gender wage gap, by skill level 
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Source: our calculations on WHIP and EC data 
Notes: ages 17-24 in panels (c)-(d) not reported for white collars due to the small number of 
individuals in the sample (less than 30 units, males and females together). 
Does the pension system mitigate the differences? 
To analyze how the redistribution put in action by the pension system modifies the 
gender gaps accumulated during the work career, let us take as a starting point the 
lifetime work income. Summing up all the wages earned by the individuals, in real 
values at the moment of retirement, the resulting lifetime work income gap is 27.7% 
(Table 3). In an actuarially neutral system, this is the gap that we would measure also 
in lifetime incomes (wages and pension benefits together). 
The first redistribution put in action by the pension system is at retirement, due to 
the pension calculation rule (see the normative section above). We can immediately 
note that the lifetime income gap is actually higher than that measured in the initial 
amount of the pension benefits (25.2%), meaning that the progressive character of the 
pension calculation rule prevails with respect to the other sources of redistribution 
we discussed. To estimate the size of the effect on a lifetime perspective we sum the 
present value of all wages (net of the social security contributions) and the present 
value  of  the  entire  stream  of  pension  benefits,  but  without considering  the  other 
possible causes of departure from actuarial neutrality – namely, assuming no partial 
indexation of high pensions, no gender differences in life expectancy, no survivor 
benefits.  The  resulting  net  effect  of  the  pension  calculation  rule  is  of  about  1.2 
percentage points, the lifetime income gap decreasing to 26.5%. 
Considering  step  by  step  the  other  sources  of  redistributions  occurring  after 
retirement,  it  results  that  the  partial  pension  indexation  of  high  pensions  has  an almost negligible effect in reducing the lifetime income gap, of about 0.1 percentage 
points.  The  most  sizeable  effect  (4.2  p.p.)  is  due  to  the  gender  differences  in  life 
expectancies at the time of retirement, which, in 2004, where about 4 years in favour 
of women. The different probability of being entitled to a survivors benefit and the 
higher average benefit earned act again in favour of women in a sizeable way (2.6 
p.p.). Summing up, pension rules reduces the substantial gender gap that opens up 
during the work careers by almost 30%, from 27.7% to 19.7%. 
Tab 3: Gender Gaps Measures 
Gender Gaps  All sample  Delay over 2 years  Direct Transitions 
Last Wage  23.47  19.71  23.37 
Seniority  14.69  16.05  8.39 
First Pension Income  31.52  34.44  25.18 
Lifetime Work Income      27.68 
       
Effect of:       
Pension calculation rule    -1.19  26.50 
Incomplete price indexation  -0.06  26.44 
Different life expectancy    -4.21  22.23 
Survivors pension    -2.57  19.66 
       
Lifetime  Income      19.66 
       
N. obs.  2047  658  1027 
% Women  31%  38%  28% 
Notes: column “Delay over 2 years” refers workers who retire after at least two years after the end of 
last employment episode; column “Direct Transitions” refers to workers who retire within nine 
months after the end of last employment episode. 
Concluding remarks 
In this paper we provided the first evidence about Italy on how the gender wage gap 
evolves during the entire work career  of individuals and how it translates into a 
further gap during retirement. 
The evidence on work careers is by and large coherent with the main evidences on 
the  wage  gap  that  we  already  know  from  the  literature.  The  main  point  is  that, 
although the average, unconditional wage gap is low – lower that what is currently 
reported for many developed Countries – this is entirely due to composition effects. 
Even controlling for just the main socio economic characteristics of the individual, 
the gender bias appears to be wide. Looking at the dynamic story, at career start 
gender differences are moderate; they open up dramatically during the first decade 
of  the  career;  in  the case  of  white  collar  women  they  continue  to  increase  up  to retirement. Conditioning just on the skill level, at retirement the gender wage gap is 
as high as 19.5% and 33.8% for blue and white collars respectively. 
Also the employment gap is sizeable: on average, women entered into retirement 
in 2004 had accumulated 14.7% less seniority with respect to men. Since seniority is a 
key variable in the pension calculation rule, the direct consequence of this is that the 
day after retirement the income gap further increases: it is 23.5% of the wage just 
before retirement, it is as high as 31.5% of the initial amount of the pension benefit. 
The latter figure is driven at least partly by a career pattern which was very common 
within Italian women of these cohorts, namely the choice to early withdraw from the 
labour market and stay out of it up to old-age pension eligibility. 
To investigate the eventual moderating role played by the pension system, we 
focussed  on  women  with  a  more  “traditional”,  male-style  career,  with  a  direct 
transition  from  work  to  retirement.  By  means  of  a  microsimulation  model  we 
recovered  the  entire  social  security  contributions  and  pension  career  of  the 
individuals  in  the  sample  and  compared  it  with  an  actuarially  neutral  system.  It 
results that on average the pension rules active at mid 2000s are redistributive in 
favour  of  women.  This  is  due  to  several  factors.  First,  the  system  has  an  overall 
progressive character that naturally tends to smooth out income differences. Second, 
the pension calculation rule does not consider any life expectancy differences, which 
bring  an  actuarial  premium  to  women.  Third,  survivor  pensions  –  as  one  could 
expect – do entail a further positive bias for women. Empirically, it is women who 
have  a  higher  probability  of  surviving  to  a  pension  earner,  and also  the  average 
survivor  benefit  they  earn  is  higher.  Taken  together,  all  these  factors  reduce  the 
lifetime income gap by almost 30%, from 27.7% to 19.7%. 
 
Although a positive role emerges from the pension system functioning as regards 
gender differentials, two considerations have to be made. 
The first is that the pension rules are gradually changing towards an actuarially 
fair system. If we do not consider the effect of the progressivity in current rules, the 
reduction in lifetime income gap would be around 25% instead of 30%. Of course, in 
a  defined  contribution  system  a  lower  pension  is  directly  attributable  to  lower 
contributions. While this has to be accounted for as an equal treatment, to cancel any 
progressivity will likely contribute to the failure of the system in providing a decent 
standard of living to a large share of women. 
The second is about survivor pensions, which is the second most important factor 
reducing lifetime income differences. While it may be considered a pillar of family 
policies within the pension legislation, it is becoming an outdated one due to the 
changes in households composition that also in Italy we are witnessing. In particular, 
single parent families are becoming a widely discussed topic in Europe, one of the 
issues being their difficulty in staying in the labour market. Life after retirement will 
simply amplify these issues. We saw in our data that most of the employment gap is 
accumulated during fertility ages. For those women who live in two parent families 
the  survivor  pension  is  the  continuation  of  the  family  support  they  already  had 
during the entire life cycle. Quite the opposite, women without this support will see the  career  gaps  they  accumulated  during  the  work  career  perpetuated  almost 
unchanged during retirement. 
We  can  expect  both  aspects  to  further  aggravate  due  a  secular  change  we  are 
witnessing  in  work  careers.  Italy,  like  most  developed  countries,  has  deeply 
deregulated its labour market. Similarly to Spain, however, the main reforms have 
been “at the margin” of the labour market, exacerbating the dualism between long 
term, highly protected dependent jobs and precarious work (Schindler 2009; Arellano 
2005). As a recent Resolution adopted by the European parliament acknowledged (19 
October 2010), precarious work affects women more than men. Moreover, the over-
representation  of  women  in  precarious  work  is  a  key  contributing  factor  to  the 
gender pay gap. This means that the issue of pension adequacy for women who will 
retire in next decades will probably get worse, while at the same time the pension 
system will fade out part of its features which are nowadays correcting the gender 
bias. We leave the investigation of this issue to a future extension of this paper. 
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